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Abstract. Building on previous work [4, 5] that bridged Formal Learning Theory
and Dynamic Epistemic Logic in a topological setting, we introduce a Dynamic
Logic for Learning Theory (DLLT), extending Subset Space Logics [17, 9] with
dynamic observation modalities [o]ϕ, as well as with a learning operator L( #»o ),
which encodes the learner’s conjecture after observing a finite sequence of data
#»o . We completely axiomatise DLLT, study its expressivity and use it to charac-
terise various notions of knowledge, belief, and learning.
Keywords: learning theory, dynamic epistemic logic, modal logic, subset space se-
mantics, inductive knowledge, epistemology
1 Introduction
The process of learning consists of incorporating new information into one’s prior
information state. Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) studies such one-step information
changes from a logical perspective [6, 19, 23]. But the general concept of learning en-
compasses not only one-step revisions, but also their long-term horizon. In the long run,
learning should lead to knowledge—an epistemic state of a particular value. Examples
include language learning (inferring the underlying grammar from examples of correct
sentences), and scientific inquiry (inferring a theory of a phenomenon on the basis of
observations). Our goal in this paper is to provide a simple logic for reasoning about this
process of inductive learning from successful observations. Understanding inductive in-
ference is of course an infamously difficult open problem, and there are many different
approaches in the literature.4 However, in this paper we do not try to solve the problem
of induction, but only to reason about a (rational) inductive learner. For this, we adopt
the more flexible and open-ended approach of Formal Learning Theory (FLT). While
most other approaches adopt a normative stance, aimed at prescribing ‘the’ correct al-
gorithm for forming and changing rational beliefs from observations (e.g., Bayesian
conditioning), or at least at prescribing some general rational constraints that any such
algorithm should obey (e.g., the AGM postulates for belief revision), FLT gives the
4 From probabilistic and statistical formalisms based on Bayesian reasoning, Popper-style mea-
sures of corroboration, through default and non-monotonic logics, Carnap-style ‘inductive
logic’, to AGM-style rational belief revision and theory change.
learner a high degree of freedom, allowing the choice of any learner that produces con-
jectures based on the data (no matter how ‘crazy’ or unjustified are these conjectures,
or how erratic is the process of belief change). In FLT the only criterion of success is...
success: tracking the truth in the limit. In other words, the only thing that matters is
whether or not the iterated belief revision process will eventually stabilise on a conjec-
ture which matches the truth (about some given issue). Of course, we are not interested
in cases of convergence to the truth ‘by accident’, but in determining whether or not a
given learner is guaranteed to eventually track the truth; hence, the focus on ‘The Logic
of Reliable Inquiry’.5
We propose a formalism that combines ideas from: Subset Space Logics, as in-
troduced by Moss and Parikh [17], investigated further by Dabrowski et al. [9] and
already merged with the DEL tradition in prior work [25, 3, 20, 22, 8, 7]; the topolog-
ical approach to FLT in [16, 5]; and the general agenda of bridging DEL and FLT in
[13]. Semantically, we take intersection spaces (a type of subset spaces that are closed
under finite non-empty intersections), with points interpreted as possible worlds and
neighbourhoods interpreted as observations (or information states) (see, e.g., [18] for a
survey on subset space logics). We enhance these structures with a learner L, mapping
every information state to a conjecture, representing the learner’s strongest belief in this
state. As in Subset Space logics, our language features an S5-type ‘knowledge-with-
certainty’ modality, capturing the learner’s hard information, as well as the so-called
‘effort’ modality, which we interpret as ‘stable truth’ (i.e., truth immune to further
observations). We add to this observation modalities [o]ϕ, analogous to the dynamic
modalities in Public Announcement Logic (PAL), as well as a learning operator L( #»o ),
which encodes the learner’s conjecture after observing a finite sequence of pieces of
evidence #»o . This can be used to give a natural definition of belief : a learner believes P
iff she knows that P is entailed by her current conjecture.
We present a sound and complete axiomatisation of DLLT with respect to our learn-
ing models. The completeness uses a neighbourhood version of the standard canonical
model construction. We use this logic to characterise various learnability notions. In
particular, we are able to model inductive learning as coming to stably believe a true
fact after observing an incoming sequence of true data. The possibility of such learning
corresponds to a key concept in FLT, namely identifiability in the limit first introduced
and studied by Gold in [15]. Finally, we discuss the expressivity of DLLT, showing that
the dynamic observation modalities are in principle eliminable via reduction laws.
1.1 Effort modality and knowledge
In [24], Vickers reconstructed general topology as a logic of observation, in which the
points of the space represent possible states of the world, while basic open neighbor-
hoods of a point are interpreted as information states produced by accumulating finitely
many observations. Moss and Parikh [17] gave an account of learning in terms of obser-
vational effort. Making the epistemic effort to obtain more information about a possible
world has a natural topological interpretation—it can be seen as shrinking the open
5 ‘The Logic of Reliable Inquiry’ is the title of a classic text in FLT-based epistemology [16].
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neighborhood (representing the current information state), thus providing a more accu-
rate approximation of the actual state of the world [17, 9, 11, 12, 18]. A similar line was
proposed in Formal Epistemology [16, 5], where it was combined with more sophisti-
cated notions of learning borrowed from FLT. The following example relates the effort
modality with knowledge.
Example 1 ([18]). Let us consider some measurement, say of a vehicle’s velocity. Sup-
pose a policeman uses radar to determine whether a car is speeding in a 50-mile speed-
limit zone. The property speeding can be identified with the interval (50,∞). Suppose
the radar shows 51 mph, but the radar’s accuracy is ±2 mph. The intuitive meaning of a
speed measurement of 51±2 is that the car’s true speed v is in the open interval (49, 53).
According to [18], “anything which we know about v must hold not only of v itself, but
also of any v′ in the same interval” [18, p. 300]. Since the interval (49, 53) is not fully
included in the ‘speeding’ interval (50,∞), the policeman does not know that the car is
speeding. But suppose that he does another measurement, using a more accurate radar
with an accuracy of ±1 mph, which shows 51.5 mph. Then he will come to know that
the car is speeding: the open interval (50.5, 52.5) is included in (50,∞).
. . . 49 50 51 52 53 ∞. . .
PQ
Fig. 1. Example 1; P := “the car is speeding”, Q := “the reading of the radar is 51 km/h”
Infallible Knowledge versus Inductive Knowledge Let us now extend this picture
with learning as understood in FLT. We start by setting the stage—briefly introducing
learning frame, the underlying structure of learning.6 Using them we will be able to
explain and model various epistemic notions.
First, consider a pair (X,O), where X is a non-empty set of possible worlds; O ⊆
P(X) is a non-empty set of information states (or ‘observables’, or ‘evidence’). We take
O to be closed on intersections, i.e., for any O1,O2 ∈ O , we have O1 ∩ O2 ∈ O , the
resulting (X,O) is called an intersection space. A learning frame is a triplet (X,O ,L),
where L : O → P(X) is a learner, i.e., a map associating to every finite sequence of
observations O ∈ O some ‘conjecture’ L(O) ⊆ X.
Let us now reconstruct Example 1 as a learning frame. We take X = (0,∞) as the
set of possible worlds (representing possible velocities of the car, where we assume the
car is known to be moving); O = {(a, b) ∈ Q × Q : 0 < a < b < ∞} is the set of all open
6 We will return to it, with complete definitions, later in the paper. Our DLLT is interpreted over
such frames.
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intervals with positive rational endpoints (representing possible measurement results by
arbitrarily accurate radars). The pair (X,O) is an intersection frame, and the topology
generated by O is the standard topology on real numbers (restricted to X).
Certain (Infallible) Knowledge In an information state U ∈ O , the learner is said to
infallibly know a proposition P ⊆ X conditional on observation O if her conditional
information state entails P, i.e, if U ∩ O ⊆ P. The learner (unconditionally) knows P
if U ⊆ P. The possibility of achieving certain knowledge about a proposition P ⊆ X
in a possible world x ∈ X by a learner L if given enough evidence (true at x) is called
learnability with certainty. In other worlds P is learnable with certainty if there exists
some observable property O ∈ O (with x ∈ O) such that the learner infallibly knows P
in information state O. Learnability can be used to define verifiability and falsifiability:
a proposition P ⊆ X is verifiable (resp. falsifiable) with certainty (by L) if it is learnable
with certainty by Lwhenever it is true (resp. false); i.e. if P is learnable with certainty at
all worlds x ∈ P (resp. x < P). Finally, a proposition P ⊆ X is decidable with certainty
(by L) if it is both verifiable and falsifiable with certainty (by L).
In the context of Example 1, let us consider the certain knowledge of the police-
man. In the information state U = (49, 53), the learner/policeman does not know the
proposition P = (50,∞), so he cannot be certain that the car is speeding. However, the
speeding property P is verifiable with certainty: whenever P is actually true, he could
perform a more accurate speed measurement, by which he can get to an information
state in which P is infallibly known. In our example, the policeman refined his mea-
surement getting to the information state O = (50.5, 52.5), thus coming to know P. In
contrast, the property X − P = (0, 50] (‘not speeding’) is not verifiable with certainty:
if by some kind of miraculous coincidence, the speed of the car is exactly 50 mph, then
the car is not speeding, but the policeman will never know that for certain (since every
speed measurement, of any degree of accuracy, will be consistent both with P and with
X − P). Nevertheless, X − P is always falsifiable with certainty: if false (i.e. if the speed
is in P, so that car is speeding), then as we saw the policeman will come to infallibly
know that (by some more accurate measurement).
Inductive (Defeasible) Knowledge
Before we proceed to Inductive Knowledge let us consider epistemic states weaker
than certainty, belief. In an information state U ∈ O , the learner L is said to:
– un-conditionally believe P ⊆ X if L(U) ⊆ P.7
– believe a proposition P ⊆ X conditional on observation O if L(U ∩ O) ⊆ P;
– have undefeated belief in a proposition P ⊆ X at world x if she believes P in every
information state O ∈ O that is true at x (i.e., x ∈ O) and is at least as strong as
U (i.e., O ⊆ U). This means that, once she reaches information state U, no further
evidence can defeat the learner’s belief in P.
One of the central problems in epistemology is to define a realistic notion of knowl-
edge that fits the needs of empirical sciences. It should allow fallibility, while requiring
a higher standards of evidence and robustness than simple belief. One of the main con-
tenders is the so-called Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge, which defines defeasible
7 In the tautological information state X, the learner believes P iff L(X) ⊆ P.
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(fallible) knowledge as true undefeated belief. In the learning-theoretic context, this
gives us an evidence-based notion of ‘inductive knowledge’: in an information state U,
P is inductively known at world x if it is true at x (i.e., x ∈ P) and it is undefeated
belief (in the sense defined above). This is the kind of knowledge that can be gained by
empirical (incomplete) induction, based on experimental evidence.
As in the case of learnability with certainty, achieving inductive knowledge is de-
fined as learnability. A proposition P ⊆ X is inductively learnable (or ‘learnable in the
limit’) by the learner L at world x if L will come to inductively know P if given enough
evidence (true at x); i.e. if there exists some observable property O ∈ O of world x
(i.e., with x ∈ O) such that L inductively knows P in information state O. Inductive
verifiability and falsifiability are defined in terms of learnability. A proposition P ⊆ X
is inductively verifiable (resp. falsifiable) by the learner L, if it is inductively learnable
whenever it is true (resp. false); i.e., if P is inductively learnable at all worlds x ∈ P
(resp. x < P). A proposition P ⊆ X is inductively decidable by L if it is both inductively
verifiable and inductively falsifiable by L.
In the context of Example 1, let us now turn to inductive knowledge of the police-
man. Both speeding (P) and non-speeding (X − P) are inductively decidable (and thus
both inductively verifiable and inductively falsifiable): for instance, they are inductively
decidable by the learner L, defined by putting L(O) := O ∩ P for every open interval
O = (a, b) ∈ O s.t. O ∩ P , ∅, and putting L(O) := O(⊆ X − P) otherwise.
Intuitively, this learner is the ‘suspicious cop’, who believes the car to be speeding
whenever the available evidence cannot settle the issue, and keeps this conjecture until
it is disproven by some more accurate measurement. Regardless of the car’s speed, this
policeman will be right ‘in the limit’: after doing enough accurate measurements, he
will eventually settle on the correct belief (about speeding or not); though of course (in
case the car’s speed is exactly 50 mph) he may still never be certain. Obviously, the dual
learner (the ‘judge’, who assumes innocence until proven guilty) will also inductively
decide the speeding issue. An example of property which is inductively decidable but
neither verifiable with certainty nor falsifiable with certainty is the proposition S =
[50, 51). It is not verifiable with certainty, since if the car’s speed is exactly 50 mph,
then Q is true but the learner will never be certain of this; and it is not falsifiable with
certainty, since if the car’s speed is exactly 51 mph, then S is false but the learner will
never be certain of that. Nevertheless, S is inductively decidable, e.g. by the learner
defined by: L(a, b) := (a, b) ∩ S for open intervals with a < 50 < b; L(a, b) := (a, b)
for open intervals (a, b) s.t. either (a, b) ⊆ S or (a, b) ∩ S = ∅; and L(a, b) := [51, b)
whenever 50 < a < 51 < b.
Dependence on the Learner It is easy to see that learnability (verifiability, falsifiability,
decidability) with certainty are learner-independent notions (since they are directed
towards achieving infallible knowledge), so they do not depend on L but only on the
underlying intersection model. In contrast, the corresponding inductive notions above
are learner-dependent. As a consequence, the interesting concepts in Learning Theory
are obtained from them by quantifying existentially over learners: a proposition P is
inductively learnable (verifiable, falsifiable, decidable) if there exists some learner L
s.t. P is respectively inductively learnable verifiable falsifiable decidable by L. This
property of a learning frame is called generic inductive learnability.
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Topological Characterizations As it is well-known in learning theory and formal epis-
temology [24, 16], the above notions are topological in nature: P is learnable with cer-
tainty at world x iff x is in the interior of P with respect to the topology generated
by O; P is verifiable with certainty iff it is open in the same topology; P is falsifiable
with certainty iff it is closed in this topology; finally, P is decidable with certainty iff
it is clopen. The corresponding inductive notions can be easily characterized [16] in
the case that the topology generated by O satisfies the separation condition8 T1: in this
case, P is inductively verifiable iff it is Σ2 in the Borel hierarchy for this topology (i.e.
a countable union of closed sets); in the same conditions, P is inductively falsifiable iff
it is Π2 (a countable intersection of open sets), and it is inductively decidable iff it is
∆2 (i.e. Σ2 and Π2). More recently, in work by three of this paper’s coauthors [5], these
characterisations were generalised to arbitrary topologies satisfying the weaker separa-
tion condition9 T0; in particular, P is inductively verifiable iff it is a countable union of
locally closed sets.10
2 Dynamic Logic for Learning Theory
In this section we introduce our ‘dynamic logic for learning theory’ DLLT. As already
mentioned, this is obtained by adding two ingredients to the language of Subset Space
Logics: dynamic observation modalities [o]ϕ and a learning operator L( #»o ).
2.1 Syntax and Semantics of DLLT
Let Prop = {p, q, . . .} be a countable set of propositional variables, denoting arbitrary
‘ontic’ (i.e., non-epistemic) facts that might hold in a world (even if they might never be
observed), and let PropO = {o, u, v, . . .} be a countable set of observational variables,
denoting ‘observable facts’ (which, if true, will eventually be observed).
Definition 1. The syntax of our language L is defined by the grammar:
ϕ ::= p | o | L( #»o ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kϕ | ϕ | [o]ϕ
where p ∈ Prop and o ∈ PropO , while #»o = (o1, . . . , on) ∈ Prop∗O is a finite sequence
of observational variables. (In particular, empty sequence is denoted by λ.) We employ
the usual abbreviations for propositional connectives >,⊥,∨,→,↔ and for the dual
modalities 〈K〉,^, 〈o〉.
The informal meaning of our formulas is as follows. Propositional variables denote
ontic facts (i.e. factual, non-epistemic features of a world), while observational vari-
ables o denote observable facts (i.e. facts that, if true, will eventually be observed).
8 This topology is T1 iff for every two distinct points x , y there exist an observation O ∈ O
with x ∈ O and y < O.
9 The observational topology is T0 iff points can be distinguished by observations; i.e. if x
and y satisfy the same observable properties in O , then x = y. Obviously, T0 is a minimally
necessary condition for any kind of learnability of the real world from observations.
10 A set is locally closed if it is the intersection of a closed and an open set.
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We read Kϕ as ‘the learner knows ϕ (with absolute certainty)’. ϕ is the so-called ‘ef-
fort modality’ from Subset Space Logic; we read ϕ as ‘ϕ is stably true’. Indeed, ϕ
holds iff ϕ is true and will stay true no matter what new (true) evidence is observed.
The operator [o]ϕ is similar to the operator [ψ]ϕ in Public Announcement Logic, but
it is restricted to the cases when ψ is a particular kind of atomic formula, namely an
observational variable o ∈ PropO . So we read [o]ϕ as ‘after o is observed, ϕ will hold’.
Finally, L( #»o ) denotes the learner’s conjecture given observations #»o ; i.e. her strongest
belief (i.e., the set of worlds considered to be most plausible) after observing #»o .
Definition 2 (Intersection Frame/Model and Learning Frame/Model). An intersec-
tion frame [17, 9] is a pair (X,O), where: X is a non-empty set of possible worlds (or
‘ontic states’); O ⊆ P(X) is a non-empty set of subsets, called information states (or
‘observables’, or ‘evidence’), which is assumed to be closed under finite intersections:
if F ⊆ O is finite then (⋂F ) ∈ O. An intersection model (X,O , ‖ · ‖) is an intersection
frame (X,O) together with a valuation map ‖ · ‖ : Prop ∪ PropO → P(X), that maps
propositional variables p into arbitrary sets ‖p‖ ⊆ X and observational variables o into
observable properties ‖o‖ ∈ O .
A learning frame is a triplet (X,O ,L), where (X,O) is an intersection frame and
L : O → P(X) is a learner, i.e. a map associating to every information state O ∈ O
some ‘conjecture’ L(O) ⊆ X, and satisfying two properties: (1) L(O) ⊆ O (conjectures
fit the evidence), and (2) if O , ∅ then L(O) , ∅ (consistency of conjectures based
on consistent evidence). We can extend L to range over strings of information states
#»
O = (O1, . . . ,On) ∈ O∗ in a natural way, by putting L( #»O) := L(⋂ #»O), where ⋂ #»O :=
O1∩. . .∩On. A learning modelM = (X,O ,L, ‖·‖) is a learning frame (X,O ,L) together
with a valuation map ‖ · ‖ : Prop ∪ PropO → P(X) as above; equivalently, it consists of
an intersection model (X,O , ‖ · ‖) together with a learner, as defined above.
Intuitively, the states in X represent possible worlds. The tautological evidence X =⋂ ∅ represents the state of ‘no information’ (before anything is observed), while the
contradictory evidence ∅ represents inconsistent information. Finally, L(O) represents
the learner’s conjecture after observing O, while L(O1, . . . ,On) = L(O1 ∩ . . . ∩ On)
represents the conjecture after observing a finite sequence of observations O1, . . . ,On.
(The fact that O is closed under finite intersections is important here for identifying any
finite sequence O1, . . . ,On with a single observation O = O1 ∩ . . .On ∈ O .)
Epistemic Scenarios. As in Subset Space Semantics, the formulas of our logic are not
interpreted at possible worlds, but at so-called epistemic scenarios, i.e. pairs (x,U) of
an ontic state x ∈ X and an information state U ∈ O such that x ∈ U. Therefore, only
the truthful observations about the actual state play a role in the evaluation of formulas.
We denote by ES (M) := {(x,U) : x ∈ U ∈ O} the set of all epistemic scenarios.
Definition 3 (Semantics). Given a learning modelM = (X,O ,L, ‖·‖) and an epistemic
scenario (x,U), the semantics of the language L is given by a binary relation (x,U) |=M
ϕ between epistemic scenario and formulas, called the satisfaction relation, as well as
a truth set (interpretation) [[ϕ]]UM =: {x ∈ U | (x,U) |=M ϕ}, for all formulas ϕ. We
typically omit the subscript, simply writing (x,U) |= ϕ and [[ϕ]]U , whenever the model
M is understood. The satisfaction relation is defined by the following recursive clauses:
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(x,U) |= p iff x ∈ ‖p‖
(x,U) |= o iff x ∈ ‖o‖
(x,U) |= L(o1, . . . , on) iff x ∈ L(U, ‖o1‖, . . . , ‖on‖)
(x,U) |= ¬ϕ iff (x,U) 6|= ϕ
(x,U) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (x,U) |= ϕ and (x,U) |= ψ
(x,U) |= Kϕ iff (∀y ∈ U) ((y,U) |= ϕ)
(x,U) |= ϕ iff (∀O ∈ O) (x ∈ O ⊆ U implies (x,O) |= ϕ)
iff (∀O ∈ O) (x ∈ O implies (x,U ∩ O) |= ϕ)
(x,U) |= [o]ϕ iff (x ∈ ‖o‖ implies (x,U ∩ ‖o‖) |= ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop, o, o1, . . . , on ∈ PropO , #»o ∈ Prop∗O , and where we used the notation
L(O1, . . . ,On) := L(O1 ∩ . . . ∩ On) introduced above. We say that a formula ϕ is valid
in a learning modelM, and writeM |= ϕ, if (x,U) |=M ϕ for all epistemic scenarios
(x,U) ∈ ES (M). We say ϕ is validable in an intersection model (X,O , ‖ · ‖), and write
(X,O , ‖ · ‖) |= ϕ, if there exists some learner L : O → P(X) such that ϕ is valid in
the learning model (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖). We say ϕ is valid, and write |= ϕ, if it is valid in all
learning models.
Abbreviations: For any string #»o = (o1, . . . , on) ∈ Prop∗O of observational variables,
and any formula ϕ we set:∧
#»o := o1 ∧ . . . ∧ on (with the convention that ∧ λ := >)
#»o ⇔ #»u := K
(
(
∧
#»o )↔ (
∧
#»u )
)
(extensional equivalence of observations)
[ #»o ]ϕ := [o1] . . . [on]ϕ (with the convention that [λ]ϕ := ϕ); similarly for 〈 #»o 〉)
B
#»o ϕ := K(L( #»o )→ ϕ)
Bϕ := Bλϕ
(where λ is the empty string). We read Bϕ as the ‘observer believes ϕ’ (given no obser-
vations), and B
#»o ϕ as ‘the observer believes ϕ conditional on evidence #»o ’.
2.2 Axiomatization and proof system
We will now provide the formal definition of our proposed system L of the Dynamic
Logic for Learning Theory (DLLT) by listing the axioms and derivation rules, see Table
1 below. Given a formula ϕ ∈ L, we denote by Pϕ and Oϕ the set of all propositional
variables and observational variables respectively occurring in ϕ (we will use the same
notation for the necessity and possibility forms defined below).
The intuitive reading of the S 5 axioms for epistemic modality K expresses the fact
that K is factive and (positively and negatively) introspective. The intuitive nature of the
reduction axioms should be as in Public Announcement Logic [2], when we take into
account the natural atomic behaviour of observables. The learning axioms (CC), (EC)
and (SP) express pre-conditions in formal learning theory on observations, namely that:
they are truthful observations about the world (CC); that the history of observations is
irrelevant for the learner, except for the extensional evidence provided by observations
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Table 1. The axiom schemas for the Dynamic Logic of Learning Theory, L
Basic axioms:
(P) all instantiations of propositional tautologies
(KK) K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
(TK) Kϕ→ ϕ
(4K) Kϕ→ KKϕ
(5K) ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ
(K[o]) [o](ψ→ χ)→ ([o]ψ→ [o]χ)
Basic rules:
(MP) From ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ, infer ` ψ
(NecK) From ` ϕ, infer ` Kϕ
(Nec[o]) From ` ϕ, infer ` [o]ϕ
Learning axioms:
(CC) (
∧
#»o )→ 〈K〉L( #»o ) Consistency of Conjectures
(EC) ( #»o ⇔ #»u )→ (L( #»o )↔ L( #»u )) Extensionality of Conjectures
(SP) L( #»o )→ ∧ #»o Success Postulate
Reduction axioms:
(Rp) [o]p↔ (o→ p)
(Ru) [o]u↔ (o→ u)
(RL) [o]L( #»u )↔ (o→ L(o, #»u ))
(R¬) [o]¬ψ↔ (o→ ¬[o]ψ)
(RK) [o]Kiψ↔ (o→ K[o]ψ)
(R) [o]ψ↔ [o]ψ
Effort axiom and rule:
(-Ax) ϕ→ [ #»o ]ϕ for all #»o ∈ Prop∗O arbitrary
(-Rule) From ` ψ → [o]ϕ, infer ` ψ → ϕ, where
o < Oψ ∪ Oϕ
(EC) and that conjectures fit what is observed (SP). Since the effort modality  quanti-
fies over possible observations, we could think of the Effort axiom and the Effort rule
as elimination and introduction rules for . The former one expresses the fact that: if a
property is stably true then it holds after any observations. Finally, the latter says that,
if a property holds after any arbitrary observation, it is stably true.
So each of our axioms is simple and readable and has a transparent intuitive in-
terpretation, in contrast to other axiomatizations of (the less expressive) Subset Space
Logic over intersection spaces (i.e., the L-free analogues of our models). Having such
a simple axiomatization is one of the advantages brought by the addition of dynamic
observation modalities. See more discussion of this issue in the Conclusions section.
We now give reduction laws for strings of observational variables in Prop∗O .
Proposition 1 (Reduction laws for strings of observational variables). The follow-
ing reduction laws are provable in L for all ϕ ∈ L:
1. [ #»u ]p↔ (∧ #»u → p)
2. [ #»u ]o↔ (∧ #»u → o)
3. [ #»u ]L( #»o )↔ (∧ #»u → L( #»u , #»o ))
4. [ #»u ]¬ϕ↔ (∧ #»u → ¬[ #»u ]ϕ)
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5. [ #»u ]Kϕ↔ (∧ #»u → K[ #»u ]ϕ)
6. [ #»u ]ϕ↔ [ #»u ]ϕ
Proposition 2. The following reduction laws are provable in L for all formulas ϕ ∈ L:
(R∧) [u](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([u]ϕ ∧ [u]ψ)
(R #»∧) [ #»u ](ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ ([ #»u ]ϕ ∧ [ #»u ]ψ)
(〈o〉) 〈o〉ψ↔ (o ∧ [o]ψ)
(〈 #»o 〉) 〈 #»o 〉ψ↔ (∧ #»o ∧ [ #»o ]ψ)
In our framework, belief (B) and conditional beliefs (B
#»o ϕ) are defined in terms of
the operators K and L. The axiomatic system L given in Table 1 over the language L
can therefore derive the properties describing the type of belief and conditional belief
modalities we intend to formalize in this paper. More precisely, as stated in Proposition
3, the system L yields the standard belief system KD45 for B. More generally, if we
replace the D axiom for a ‘weaker’ version D′ := (〈K〉 #»o → ¬B #»o ⊥) then we have a
weak version of KD45 system for conditional belief B
#»o , namely wKD45.
Proposition 3 (wKD45 axioms and rules for Conditional Belief). The standard ax-
ioms and rules of the doxastic logic KD45 are derivable for our belief operator B in
the system L. More generally, the axioms of rules of the weaker system wKD45 are
derivable for our conditional-belief operator Bo in the system L.
Proposition 4. The S4 axioms for the effort modality  are derivable in L.
3 Soundness and Completeness
In this section we prove soundness and completeness. Note that, although our logic
is more expressive than Subset Space Logic (interpreted on intersection spaces), our
completeness proof is much simpler, via a canonical construction: this is one of the
advantages of having the (expressively redundant) dynamic observation modalities!
Soundness We first prove soundness, for which we need the following lemma. Note
that by the definition of the valuation || · || in a learning modelM, we have that for all
U ∈ O , U ∩ ||p|| = [[p]]UM and U ∩ ||o|| = [[o]]UM for all p ∈ Prop and o ∈ PropO in L.
Lemma 1. Let M = (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖) and M = (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖′) be two learning models
and ϕ ∈ L such thatM andM′ differ only in the valuation of some o < Oϕ. Then, for
all U ∈ O , we have [[ϕ]]UM = [[ϕ]]UM′ .
Theorem 1. The system L in Table 1 is sound wrt the class of learning models.
Completeness We now move to the completeness proof for our logic L, which will be
shown via a ‘simple’ canonical model construction. But its simplicity is deceiving, due
to two main technical differences between our construction and the standard canonical
model from Modal Logic. First, this is not a relational (Kripke) model, but a neighbor-
hood model; so the closest analogue is the type of canonical construction used in Topo-
logical Modal Logic or Neighborhood Semantics [1]. Second, the standard notion of
maximally consistent theory is not very useful for our logic, since such theories do not
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‘internalize’ the -Rule. To do this, we need instead to consider ‘witnessed’ (maximally
consistent) theories, in which every occurrence of a ^ϕ in any “existential context” is
‘witnessed’ by some 〈o〉ϕ (with o observational variable). The appropriate notion of
“existential contexts” is represented by possibility forms, in the following sense:
Definition 4 (‘Pseudo-modalities’: necessity and possibility forms). The set of necessity-
form expressions of our language is given by NFL := ({ϕ→ | ϕ ∈ L} ∪ {K} ∪ PropO)∗.
For any finite string s ∈ NFL, we define ’pseudo-modalities’ [s] (called necessity form)
and 〈s〉 (called possibility form), that generalize our dynamic modalities [o] and 〈o〉.
These pseudo-modalities are just functions mapping any formula ϕ ∈ L to another for-
mula [s]ϕ ∈ L, and respectively 〈s〉ϕ ∈ L. Necessity forms are defined recursively, by
putting: [λ]ϕ := ϕ, [ϕ →, s]ϕ := ϕ → [s]ϕ, [K, s]ϕ := K[s]ϕ, [o, s]ϕ := [o][s]ϕ. As for
possibility forms, we put 〈s〉ϕ := ¬[s]¬ϕ.
Lemma 2. For every necessity form [s], there exist an observational variable o ∈ L
and a formula ψ ∈ L such that for all ϕ ∈ L, we have: ` [s]ϕ iff ` ψ→ [o]ϕ.
Proof. The proof follows similarly as in [2, Lemma 4.8], but is even simpler since our
dynamic modalities only involve observational variables which are atomic formulas.
Lemma 3. The following rule is admissible in L:
if ` [s][o]ϕ then ` [s]ϕ, where o < Os ∪ Oϕ.
Proof. Suppose ` [s][o]ϕ where o < Os∪Oϕ. Then, by Lemma 2, there exist u ∈ PropO
and ψ ∈ L such that ` ψ → [u][o]ϕ. Thus we get ` ψ → [u, o]ϕ. It is not hard to
see that ` [u, o]ϕ ↔ [o, u]ϕ (which follows by subformula induction on ϕ, using the
corresponding reduction axiom given in Proposition 1, and the fact that ` u∧o↔ o∧u).
Therefore, ` ψ → [u, o]ϕ iff ` ψ → [o, u]ϕ. Hence we obtain ` ψ → [o, u]ϕ, i.e.,
` ψ→ [o][u]ϕ. By the construction of the formulas ψ and u, we know that Oψ∪Ou ⊆ Os,
and so o < Oψ ∪ {u} ∪Oϕ. Therefore, by the Effort rule (-Rule) we have ` ψ→ [u]ϕ,
implying, by the reduction axiom (R), that ` ψ → [u]ϕ. Applying again Lemma 2,
we obtain ` [s]ϕ.
Definition 5. For every countable set O, let LO be the language of the logic LO based
only on the observational variables in O (i.e. having as set of observational variables
PropO := O). Let NF
O
L
denote the set of necessity-form expressions of LO (i.e. necessity
forms involving only observational variables in O). An O-theory is a consistent set of
formulas in LO. Here, ‘consistent’ means consistent with respect to the axiomatization
L formulated for LO. A maximal O-theory is an O-theory Γ that is maximal with respect
to ⊆ among all O-theories; in other words, Γ cannot be extended to another O-theory.
An O-witnessed theory is an O-theory Γ such that, for every s ∈ NFO
L
and ϕ ∈ LO, if
〈s〉^ϕ is consistent with Γ then there is o ∈ O such that 〈s〉〈o〉ϕ is consistent with Γ. A
maximal O-witnessed theory Γ is an O-witnessed theory that is not a proper subset of
any O-witnessed theory.
Lemma 4. For every Γ ⊆ LO, if Γ is an O-theory and Γ 0 ¬ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LO, then
Γ ∪ {ϕ} is an O-theory. Moreover, if Γ is O-witnessed, then Γ ∪ {ϕ} is also O-witnessed.
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Lemma 5 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma). Every O-witnessed theory Γ can be extended to
a maximal O-witnessed theory TΓ.
Lemma 6 (Extension Lemma). Let O be a set of observational variables and O′ be
a countable set of fresh observational variables, i.e., O ∩ O′ = ∅. Let ∼O = O ∪ O′.
Then, every O-theory Γ can be extended to a
∼
O-witnessed theory
∼
Γ ⊇ Γ, and hence to
a maximal
∼
O-witnessed theory TΓ ⊇ Γ.
We are now ready to build the canonical model.
Canonical Model for T0. For any consistent set of formulas Φ, consider a maximally
consistent O-witnessed extension T0 ⊇ Φ. As our canonical set of worlds, we take the
set Xc := {T : T maximally consistent O-witnessed theory with T ∼K T0}, where we
put T ∼K T ′ iff ∀ϕ ∈ LO ((Kϕ) ∈ T → ϕ ∈ T ′) . As usual, it is easy to see (given the
S 5 axioms for K) that ∼K is an equivalence relation. For any formula ϕ, we use the
notation ϕ̂ := {T ∈ Xc : ϕ ∈ T }. In particular, for any observational variable o ∈ O, we
have ô = {T ∈ Xc : o ∈ T }. We can generalize this notation to finite sequences #»o =
(o1, . . . , on) ∈ O∗ of observational variables, by putting: #̂»o := {T ∈ Xc : o1, . . . , on ∈ T }.
As canonical set of information states, we take Oc := { #̂»o : #»o ∈ O∗}. Finally, our
canonical learner is given by Lc( #̂»o ) := L̂( #»o ), and the canonical valuation ‖ · ‖c is
given as ||p||c = p̂ and ||o||c = ô. The learning modelMc = (Xc,Oc,Lc, ‖ · ‖c) is called
the canonical model. Note that we use c as a subindex instead of a superindex for the
canonical valuation ‖ · ‖c, this is in order to avoid confusion with our ‘open-restriction’
notation for the truth set of a formula [[ϕ]]U .
Before proving that the canonical model is well-defined, we need the following.
Lemma 7. For every maximal O-witnessed theory T , the set {θ : Kθ ∈ T } is an O-
witnessed theory.
Lemma 8. Let T ∈ Xc. Then, Kϕ ∈ T iff ϕ ∈ S for all S ∈ Xc.
Corollary 1. Let T ∈ Xc. Then, 〈K〉ϕ ∈ T iff there is S ∈ Xc, such that ϕ ∈ S .
Proposition 5. The canonical model is well-defined.
Proof. We need to show that the following properties hold:
1. If F = { #̂»o1, . . . , #̂ »om} ⊆ Oc is finite then ⋂ F ∈ Oc: Let F = { #̂»o1, . . . , #̂ »om} ⊆ Oc. It
is easy to see that
⋂{ #̂»o1, . . . , #̂ »om} = #̂»o , where #»o is the concatenation of all the #»oi’s
with 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since each #»oi is finite, #»o is finite. Therefore, by the definition of
Oc, we obtain
⋂{ #̂»o1, . . . , #̂ »om} = #̂»o ∈ Oc.
2. Lc is a well-defined function and a learner: For this, note that Lc( #̂»o ) := L̂( #»o ) ⊆ Xc.
We will first prove that:
(2a) if #̂»o = #̂»u then Lc( #̂»o ) = Lc( #̂»u ): Suppose #̂»o = #̂»u . This means that (∀T ∈
Xc)(
∧
#»o ∈ T iff ∧ #»u ∈ T ). Therefore, we obtain ` ∧ #»o ↔ ∧ #»u . Then, by
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(NecK), we have ` K (∧ #»o ↔ ∧ #»u ), i.e., ` #»o ⇔ #»u . Since Lc( #̂»o ) := L̂( #»o ), showing
Lc( #̂»o ) = Lc( #̂»u ) boils down to showing that L̂( #»o ) = L̂( #»u ), i.e., that ` L( #»o )↔ L( #»u ),
which follows from axiom (EC) and the assumption that ` #»o ⇔ #»u .
Next, we must prove that
(2b) Lc is a learner, i.e., Lc satisfies the properties of a learner given in Definition
2. To show this, we first check that Lc( #̂»o ) ⊆ #̂»o holds. Let T ∈ Lc( #̂»o ). This means,
by the definition of Lc( #̂»o ), that L( #»o ) ∈ T . Since (L( #»o )→ ∧ #»o ) ∈ T (by the axiom
(SP)), we have that
∧
#»o ∈ T . Therefore, as T is maximally consistent, we obtain
o1, . . . , om ∈ T for #»o = (o1, . . . , om), meaning that #»o ∈ T . Thus, T ∈ #̂»o . Finally
we show that if #̂»o , ∅ then Lc( #̂»o ) , ∅. Suppose #̂»o , ∅, i.e., there is T ∈ Xc with
T ∈ #̂»o . This means, by the definition of #̂»o , that #»o ∈ T . Then, since T is a maximal
consistent theory, we have
∧
#»o ∈ T , and ((∧ #»o ) → 〈K〉L( #»o )) ∈ T (by the axiom
(CC)). Thus we obtain 〈K〉L( #»o ) ∈ T . Then, by Corollary 1, there is S ∈ Xc such
that L( #»o ) ∈ S . Thus, by the definition of L̂( #»o ), we have S ∈ L̂( #»o ), and therefore,
L̂( #»o ) = Lc( #̂»o ) , ∅.
Our aim is to prove a Truth Lemma for the canonical model, that will immediately
imply completeness, as usual. But for this we first need the following result.
Lemma 9. Let T ∈ Xc. Then, ϕ ∈ T iff [ #»u ]ϕ ∈ T for all #»u ∈ Prop∗O.
We now proceed to our key result:
Lemma 10 (Truth Lemma). For all formulas ϕ, all T ∈ Xc and all #̂»o ∈ Oc, we have:
〈 #»o 〉ϕ ∈ T iff (T, #̂»o ) |=Mc ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction over subformulas. The cases for propositional and
observational variables, as well as for Boolean connectives are as usual. So we only
check the remaining cases. At each step of the proof,
∧
#»o ∈ T guarantees that the pair
(T, #̂»o ) is a well-defined epistemic scenario of the canonical model since
∧̂
#»o = #̂»o .
– Case ϕ := L( #»u ).
〈 #»o 〉L( #»u ) ∈ T iff (
∧
#»o ∧ [ #»o ]L( #»u )) ∈ T (Proposition 2-(〈 #»o 〉))
iff (
∧
#»o ∧ L( #»o , #»u )) ∈ T (Proposition 1.3)
iff
∧
#»o ∈ T and L( #»o , #»u ) ∈ T
iff T ∈ #̂»o and T ∈ L( #»o , #»u )
∧
= Lc( #̂»o , #̂»u ) (since
∧̂
#»o = #̂»o )
iff (T, #̂»o ) |=Mc L( #»u ) (by the semantics of L)
– Case ϕ := Kψ.
〈 #»o 〉Kψ ∈ T iff (
∧
#»o ∧ K[ #»o ]ψ) ∈ T (Propositions 2-(〈 #»o 〉) and 1.5)
iff
∧
#»o ∈ T and K[ #»o ]ψ ∈ T
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iff
∧
#»o ∈ T and (∀S ∼K T )([ #»o ]ψ ∈ S ) (by Lemma 8)
iff
∧
#»o ∈ T and (∀S ∈ #̂»o )(〈 #»o 〉ψ ∈ S ) (Propositions 2-(〈 #»o 〉))
iff #̂»o ∈ T and (∀S ∈ #̂»o )((S , #̂»o ) |= ψ) (by ∧̂ #»o = #̂»o and I.H)
iff (T, #̂»o ) |=Mc Kψ (by the semantics of K)
– Case ϕ := 〈 #»u 〉ψ.
〈 #»o 〉〈 #»u 〉ψ ∈ T iff 〈 #»o , #»u 〉ψ ∈ T (by the abbreviation for 〈 #»o 〉ψ)
iff (
∧
#»o ∧
∧
#»u ) ∧ 〈 #»o , #»u 〉ψ ∈ T (Propositions 2-(〈 #»o 〉))
iff (
∧
#»o ∧
∧
#»u ) ∈ T and 〈 #»o , #»u 〉ψ ∈ T
iff T ∈ #̂»o ∩ #̂»u and 〈 #»o , #»u 〉ψ ∈ T (since ∧ #»o ∧∧ #»u = #̂»o ∩ #̂»u )
iff T ∈ ( #»o , #»u )
∧
and (T, ( #»o , #»u )
∧
) |= ψ (since ( #»o , #»u ) = #̂»o ∩ #̂»u )
iff T ∈ || #»o , #»u ||c and (T, || #»o , #»u ||c) |= ψ (by the definition of || · ||c)
iff (T, || #»o , #»u ||c) |= 〈 #»o , #»u 〉ψ (by the semantics)
iff (T, || #»o , #»u ||c) |= 〈 #»o 〉〈 #»u 〉ψ (by the abbreviation for 〈 #»o 〉ψ)
– Case ϕ := ψ.
(⇐) Suppose 〈 #»o 〉ψ ∈ T . Then, by Propositions 2-(〈 #»o 〉) and Proposition 1.6, we
obtain that (1)
∧
#»o ∈ T , i.e., T ∈ #̂»o , and (2) [ #»o ]ψ ∈ T . Thus, by Lemma 9
and (2), we have [ #»u ][ #»o ]ψ ∈ T , i.e., [ #»u , #»o ]ψ ∈ T , for all #»u ∈ Prop∗O. Now let
O ∈ Oc such that T ∈ O. By the construction of Oc , we know that O = #̂»v for some
#»v ∈ Prop∗O. We want to show that (T, #̂»o ∩ #̂»v ) |= ψ. Since T ∈ #̂»o ∩ #̂»v andMc is an
intersection space, we know that (T, #̂»o ∩ #̂»v ) is a well-defined epistemic scenario.
T ∈ #̂»o ∩ #̂»v also implies that (∧ #»o ∧ ∧ #»v ) ∈ T as in the above case. Hence,
by Proposition 2-(〈 #»o 〉) and the fact that [ #»v , #»o ]ψ ∈ T , we obtain 〈 #»v , #»o 〉ψ ∈ T .
Then, by I.H, we obtain (T, #̂»v ∩ #̂»o ) |= ψ as in the previous case. Therefore, by the
semantics of , we obtain (T, #̂»o ) |= ψ.
(⇒) Suppose (T, #̂»o ) |= ψ. This means, by the definition of Oc, that for all #»u ∈
Prop∗O, if T ∈ #̂»u then (T, #̂»o ∩ #̂»u ) |= ψ. Now let #»v ∈ Prop∗O such that T ∈ #̂»v .
Therefore, T ∈ #̂»v ∩ #̂»o . Since ( #»v , #»o ) ∈ Prop∗O and #̂»v ∩ #̂»o = ( #»v , #»o )
∧
, we obtain by
the assumption that (T, #̂»v ∩ #̂»o ) |= ψ. Thus, by I.H., we have 〈 #»v , #»o 〉ψ ∈ T . As `
〈 #»v , #»o 〉ψ→ [ #»v , #»o ]ψ and T is maximal, we obtain [ #»v , #»o ]ψ ∈ T , i.e., [ #»v ][ #»o ]ψ ∈ T .
Hence, by Lemma 9, we have [ #»o ]ψ ∈ T . Then, by Proposition 1.6, the fact that∧
#»o ∈ T and Propositions 2-(〈 #»o 〉) and, we obtain 〈 #»o 〉ψ ∈ T .
Theorem 2. L is complete with respect to the class of all learning models.
Proof. Let ϕ be an L-consistent formula, i.e., it is an Oϕ-theory. Then, by Lemma 6, it
can be extended to a maximal Oϕ-witnessed theory T . Then, we have 〈λ〉ϕ ∈ T where
λ is the empty string, i.e., T ∈ 〈̂λ〉ϕ. Note that ∧̂ λ = ⋂ ∅ = Xc. Then, by Truth Lemma
(Lemma 10), we obtain that (T, Xc) |=Mc ϕ, where Mc = (Xc,Oc,Lc, ‖ · ‖c) is the
canonical model for T . This proves completeness.
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4 Expressivity
We first investigate how various notions of learnability can be expressed in our lan-
guage. In fact, the following result was already noticed in [17]:
Proposition 6. ^K p is true at (x,U) in a modelM iff ‖p‖ is learnable with certainty
at state x. Similarly, p → ^K p is valid (i.e. true at all epistemic scenarios) in a model
M iff ‖p‖ is verifiable with certainty (i.e. ‘finitely identifiable’ in the sense of FLT [10,
14]). A similar statement holds for falsifiability with certainty.
Proof. As we know from Section 1.1, ‖p‖ is learnable with certainty x iff x ∈ Int‖p‖,
and ‖p‖ is verifiable with certainty iff it is open in the topology generated by O . It is
well-known [17] that these properties are expressible in SSL via the above validities.
In particular, the following validity of our logic expresses the fact that all observable
properties are verifiable with certainty:
o→ ^Ko.
By adding the learning operator to subset space logic, DLLT can capture, not only
belief, but also the various inductive notions of knowledge and learnability:
Proposition 7. [Inductive notions of knowledge and learnability]
– Bp holds at (x,U) in a modelM iff the learner L has undefeated belief in ‖p‖ (at
world x in information state U). Hence, p ∧ Bp captures inductive knowledge of
p, and so p ∧ ^Bp captures inductive learnability of p by learner L.
– Similarly, p → ^Bp is valid in a model M iff ‖p‖ is inductively verifiable by
L. For the corresponding generic notion: ‖p‖ is inductively verifiable (by some
learner) iff p → ^Bp is validable in the intersection space (X,O). Similar state-
ments hold for inductive fasifiability.
– Finally, ^L(λ) is true if (given enough observations) the observer will eventually
reach a true conjecture (though he might later fall again into false ones); and sim-
ilarly, ^L(λ) is true if (given enough observations) the observer will eventually
produce only true conjectures thereafter.
Proof. This is an easy verification, given the relevant definitions and our semantics.
As usual in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, the dynamic ‘observation’ modalities [u]ϕ
are only a convenient way to express complex properties in a succinct manner, but they
can in principle be eliminated. To show this, we first need the following lemma.
Lemma 11. There is a well-founded strict partial order < on formulas (called ‘com-
plexity order’), satisfying the following conditions:
– if ϕ is a (proper) subformula of ψ then ϕ < ψ
– (u→ p) < [u]p
– (u→ o) < [u]o
– L(u, #»o ) < [u]L( #»o )
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– ([u]ϕ ∧ [u]ψ) < [u](ϕ ∧ ψ)
– (u→ K[u]ϕ) < [u]Kϕ
– [u]ϕ < [u]ϕ
Proposition 8. (Expressivity) The above language is co-expressive with the one ob-
tained by removing all dynamic modalities [u]ϕ. Moreover, this can be proved in the
above proof system: for every formula ϕ there exists some formula ϕ′ free of any dy-
namic modalities, such that ϕ ↔ ϕ′ is a theorem in the above proof system. Further-
more, if ϕ contains dynamic modalities then ϕ′ can be chosen such that ϕ′ < ϕ.
5 Conclusion and Comparison with Other Work
In this paper we proposed a dynamic logic which allows reasoning about inductive
inference. Our Dynamic Logic of Learning Theory (DLLT) is an extension of previ-
ously studied Subset Space Logics, and a natural continuation of the work bridging
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Formal Learning Theory. Together with a syntax, featur-
ing dynamic observation operators, and a topological semantics, we give a sound and
complete axiomatization of this logic. We show how natural learnability properties, as
learnability in the limit and learnability with certainty, can be expressed in DLLT.
Our technical results (the complete axiomatization and expressivity results), as well
as the methods used to prove them (the canonical neighborhood model and the reduc-
tion laws), may look deceivingly simple. But in fact, achieving this simplicity is one
of the major contributions of our paper! The most well-known relative to our logic is
Subset Space Logic (SSL) over intersection spaces, completely axiomatized by Weiss
and Parikh [26] (- and indeed our operator  originates in the ‘effort modality’ of the
SSL formalism introduced in [17, 9]). Although less expressive than our logic (since it
has no notion of belief B or conjecture L), the Weiss-Parikh axiomatization of SSL over
intersection spaces is in a sense more complex and less transparent (as is their complete-
ness proof, which is non-canonical). That axiomatization consists of the following list:
S 5K The S 5 axioms and rules for K
S 4 The S 4 axioms and rules for 
Cross Axiom Kϕ→ Kϕ
Weak Directedness ^ϕ→ ^ϕ
Mn (for all n) (〈K〉ϕ∧^Kψ1∧ . . .∧^Kψn)→ 〈K〉(^ϕ∧^Kψ1∧ . . .∧^Kψn)
Though this list looks shorter than our list in Table 1, each of our axioms is simple
and readable and has a transparent intuitive interpretation. In contrast, note the com-
plexity and opaqueness of the last axiom schemata Mn above (having one schema for
each natural number n)! Our completeness result implies that all these complex validi-
ties are provable in our simple system (and in fact in the even simpler system obtained
by deleting from ours all the axioms that refer to the learner L). This shows the useful-
ness of adding the (expressively redundant) dynamic observation modalities: they help
to describe the behavior of the effort modality  in a much simpler and natural manner,
via the combination of the Effort axiom and the Effort rule (which together capture the
meaning of  as universally quantifying over observation modalities).
Moreover, our completeness proof is also much simpler (though with some technical
twists). Traditionally, the use of canonical models has been considered impossible for
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Subset Space Logics, and so authors had to use other, more ad-hoc methods (e.g. step-
by-step constructions). The fact that in this paper we can get away with a canonical
construction is again due to the addition of the dynamic modalities.
More recent papers, closely related to our logic, are Bjorndahl [8], van Ditmarsch
et alia [20, 21], and Baltag et alia [7]. Bjorndahl [8] introduces dynamic modalities
[ϕ] for arbitrary formulas (rather than restricting to observational variables [o], as we
do), though with a different semantics (according to which [ϕ] restricts the space to the
interior of ϕ, in contrast to our simpler semantics, that follows the standard definition of
update or “public announcement’). His syntax does not contain the effort modality, or
any other form of quantifying over observations. The work of van Ditmarsch et alia [20,
21] uses Bjorndahl-style dynamic modalities in combination with a topological version
of the so-called “arbitrary public announcement” operator, which is a more syntactic-
driven relative of the effort modality. This syntactic nature comes with a price: the
logic of arbitrary public announcements is much less well-behaved than SSL (or our
logic), in particular it has non-compositional features (-the meaning of a formula may
depend on the meaning of all atomic variables, including the ones that do not occur in
that formula!). As a consequence, the soundness of (the arbitrary-public announcement
analogue of) our Effort Rule is not at all obvious for their logic, which instead relies on
an infinitary inference rule. Since that rule makes use of infinitely many premisses, their
complete axiomatization is truly infinitary, and impossible to automatize: indeed, it does
not even necessarily imply that the set of their validities is recursively enumerable (in
contrast with our finitary axiomatization, which immediately implies such a result ). The
recent, unpublished work by Baltag et alia [7] (due to a subset of the current authors,
using techniques similar to the ones we used in this paper) fixes these problems by
replacing the arbitrary announcement modality with the effort modality (or equivalently,
extending SSL with Bjorndahl-style dynamic modalities). But note that, in contrast to
the work presented here, all the above papers are concerned only with axiomatizations
over topological spaces (rather than the wider class of intersection spaces), and that
none of them has any belief B or conjecture operators L. Hence, none of them can be
used to capture any learning-theoretic notions going beyond finite identifiability.
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6 Proofs of Section 2.2: Axiomatization and proof system
Proof (Proposition 1. Reduction laws for strings of observational variables). The proofs
follow directly from instances of the corresponding reduction axiom for one observa-
tional variable, by (K[o]) and the definition [ #»o ] := [o1][o2] . . . [om]. To illustrate the
proof, we provide the one corresponding to the base case: [ #»u ]p↔ (∧ #»u → p).
Recall that #»u := uk, . . . , u2, u1. W.l.o.g suppose k = 2.
From left to right:
`[u2, u1]p→ [u2][u1]p (by definition of [ #»u ])
`[u2, u1]p→ [u2](u1 → p) (by reducc.ax (Rp))
`[u2, u1]p→ ([u2]u1 → [u2]p) (by K[o] axiom)
`[u2, u1]p→ ((u2 → u1)→ (u2 → p)) (by reducc.ax (Ro) and (Rp))
`[u2, u1]p→ (((u2 → u1) ∧ u2)→ p) (by CPL)
`[u2, u1]p→ ((u1 ∧ u2)→ p) (by CPL)
From right to left:
`((u2 ∧ u1)→ p)→ (u2 → (u1 → p)) (tautology in CPL)
`[u2](((u2 ∧ u1)→ p)→ (u2 → (u1 → p))) (by Nec[o])
`[u2]((u2 ∧ u1)→ p)→ [u2](u2 → (u1 → p)) (by K[o] and MP)
`([u2](u2 ∧ u1)→ [u2]p)→ ([u2]u2 → [u2][u1]p) (by K[o] and reducc.ax (Rp))
`([u2]u2 ∧ [u2]u1 → (u2 → p))→ ((u2 → u2)→ [u2][u1]p)
(by R∧, the reducc.ax (Rp) and (Ro))
`(([u2]u2 ∧ [u2]u1 ∧ u2)→ p)→ ([u2][u1]p) (by CPL)
`((u2 ∧ (u2 → u1) ∧ u2)→ p)→ [u2][u1]p (by CPL)
`((u2 ∧ u1)→ p)→ [u2][u1]p (by CPL)
We use the axiom (R∧) that appears in the proposition that follows (in Proposition
2). Although the proof for (R∧) is straightforward and independent of the axioms stated
in Proposition 1.
Proof (Proposition 2). The proofs go straightforwardly, (R∧) follows from the axioms
(K[o]) and (Nec[o]) and (R #»∧) follows from (R∧) and the definition [ #»o ] := [o1][o2] . . . [om];
the reduction law (〈o〉) follows from the definition 〈o〉ψ := ¬[o]¬ψ and the reduc-
tion axiom (R¬). The proof of (〈 #»o 〉) follows directly from (〈o〉) and the definitions
〈o〉ψ := ¬[o]¬ψ and [ #»o ] := [o1][o2] . . . [om].
Proof (Proposition 3. The wKD45 axioms and rules for Conditional Belief). Let #»o ∈
Prop∗O . We prove Necessitation Rule for B
#»o and only the axioms K, D’ and 4 since 5
follows similarly as 4.
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– Necessitation Rule for B #»o : From ` ϕ infer ` B #»o ϕ.
`ϕ (by our innitial assumption, ϕ is a theorem)
`L( #»o )→ ϕ (by CPL)
`K(L( #»o )→ ϕ) (by rule (NecK ))
`B #»o ϕ
– Axiom K for B #»o : For this we need to show that ` K(L( #»o ) → (ϕ → ψ)) →
K(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ K(L( #»o )→ ψ):
`K(L( #»o )→ (ϕ→ ψ))
`K((L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ (L( #»o )→ ψ)) (by CPL)
`K(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ K(L( #»o )→ ψ) (by (KK))
– Axiom D’ for B #»o : We need to prove ` 〈K〉 #»o → ¬B #»o ⊥, i.e., to prove ` 〈K〉 #»o →
¬K(¬L( #»o ) ∨⊥). Moreover, It is easy to see that the consequent of this implication
is equivalent to 〈K〉L( #»o ). Thus it suffices to be proved ` 〈K〉 #»o → 〈K〉L( #»o ):
`L( #»o )→
∧
#»o (is (SP) axiom)
`K(L( #»o )→
∧
#»o ) (by (NecK) rule)
`K(L( #»o ))→ K(
∧
#»o ) (by (KK) axiom and MP with previous step)
`〈K〉 #»o → 〈K〉L( #»o ) (the dual of the formula in previous step)
– Axiom 4 for B #»o : For this we need to show that ` K(L( #»o ) → ϕ) → K(L( #»o ) →
B
#»o ϕ). It is easy to see that this is equivalent to showing that ` K(L( #»o ) → ϕ) →
K(L( #»o )→ K(K(L( #»o ))→ Kϕ):
1) `K(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ KK(L( #»o )→ ϕ) (by axiom (4K))
2) `KK(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ K(K(L( #»o ))→ Kϕ) (by axiom (KK))
3) `KK(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ (K(L( #»o ))→ K(K(L( #»o ))→ Kϕ)) (by CPL)
4) `K(L( #»o )→ ϕ)→ (K(L( #»o ))→ K(K(L( #»o ))→ Kϕ)) (by 1,3 and CPL)
Proposition 9. The S4 axioms for the effort modality  are derivable in L.
Proof (Proposition 9. The S4 laws for ). The proofs of the S4 laws for  are very
straightforward simply by using classical propositional logic (CPL), the axiom (-Ax)
and/or (-Rule). The most engaged proof is the one for Kripke’s axiom (K) for the
effort modality , so we show it here. By CPL, it is equivalent to showing ((ϕ →
ψ) ∧ ϕ)→ ψ, which proceeds as follows:
1) `((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)→ ([o](ϕ→ ψ) ∧ [o]ϕ) (by (-Ax) for some o < Oϕ ∪ Oψ)
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2) `([o](ϕ→ ψ) ∧ [o]ϕ)→ ([o]ϕ→ [o]ψ) ∧ [o]ϕ (by axiom (K[o]))
3) `(([o]ϕ→ [o]ψ) ∧ [o]ϕ)→ [o]ψ (by CPL)
4) `([o](ϕ→ ψ) ∧ [o]ϕ)→ [o]ψ (by CPL and steps 2 and 3)
5) `((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)→ [o]ψ (by CPL and step 1)
6) `((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ)→ ψ (by o < Oϕ ∪ Oψ and (-Rule))
7 Proofs of Section 3: Soundness and Completeness
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows by subformula induction on ϕ.
LetM = (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖) andM = (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖′) be two learning models such thatM
andM′ differ only in the valuation of some o < Oϕ, and let U ∈ O .
– The base cases:
Case ϕ := q where q ∈ Prop follows simply because q is not an observational
variable, thus for all q ∈ Pϕ we have that ||q||M = ||q||M′ . SinceM andM′ have the
same set of opens O , for all U ∈ O we have that [[q]]UM = U ∩ ||q||M = U ∩ ||q||M′ =
[[q]]UM′ .
Case ϕ := v where v ∈ PropO , follows simply because since v ∈ Oϕ we have that
||v||M = ||v||M′ . By a similar reasoning as before, [[v]]UM = [[v]]UM′ .
– Case ϕ := L( #»v )
Note that OL( #»v ) = O #»v = {v1, . . . , vn} and ||vi||M = ||vi||M′ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus
[[ #»v ]]UM = [[
#»v ]]UM′ for every U ∈ O . Therefore, since L and O are the same in both
models we have that [[L( #»v )]]UM = [[L(
#»v )]]UM′ .
– Booleans: The cases for Booleans are straightforward.
– Case ϕ := ¬ψ. It follows straightforwardly from O¬ψ = Oψ and simple algebra of
sets.
– Case ϕ := Kψ
Note that OKψ = Oψ. Then, by induction hypothesis (IH), we have that [[ψ]]UM =
[[ψ]]UM′ . We have two case (1) if U = [[ψ]]
U
M = [[ψ]]
U
M′ , then [[Kψ]]
U
M = [[Kψ]]
U
M′ = U,
and (2) if [[ψ]]UM = [[ψ]]
U
M′ , U, then we have [[Kψ]]
U
M = [[Kψ]]
U
M′ = ∅.
– Case ϕ := [v]ψ
Note that O[v]ψ = {v} ∪ Oψ. Suppose x ∈ [[[v]ψ]]UM and x ∈ ||v||M′ . By IH on v,
we have ||v||M = ||v||M′ . Therefore, from x ∈ [[[v]ψ]]UM and x ∈ ||v||M, we have
(x,U ∩ ||v||M) |=M ψ. Since U ∩ ||v||M = U ∩ ||v||M′ and U ∩ ||v||M′ ∈ O , by IH
on ψ, we obtain (x,U ∩ ||v||M′ ) |=M′ ψ. We then conclude x ∈ [[[v]ψ]]UM′ . The other
direction follows similarly.
– Case ϕ := ψ
Suppose x ∈ [[ψ]]UM. This means, by the semantics of , that for all O ∈ O with
x ∈ O ⊆ U we have that (x,O) |=M ψ, i.e., that x ∈ [[ψ]]OM. Therefore, by IH and
the fact that Oψ = Oψ, we obtain x ∈ [[ψ]]OM′ for all O ⊆ U. Since M and M′
carry exactly the same collection O , we conclude that x ∈ [[ψ]]UM′ . The opposite
direction follows similarly.
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7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The soundness proof follows simply by validity check. We here only present the validity
proofs for the Learning axioms (all), the Reduction axioms RL, R, as well as the Effort-
axiom (-Ax) and Effort-rule (-Rule). The other cases follow standardly.
LetM = (X,O ,L, ‖ · ‖) be a learning model and (x,U) ∈ ES (M).
– Learning axioms:
• (CC): Suppose (x,U) |= ∧ #»o . This means that x ∈ [[∧ #»o ]]U . Thus x ∈ [[ #»o ]]U .
We want to show that (x,U) |= 〈K〉L( #»o ), i.e., to show that ∃y ∈ U s.t (y,U) |=
L( #»o ), i.e., by the semantic definition of L, ∃y ∈ U s.t y ∈ L(U, [[ #»o ]]). Recall
that L(
#»
O) := L(∩ #»O), L(O) ⊆ O for every O ∈ O and L(O) , ∅ if O , ∅.
Since x ∈ [[oi]]U for every oi ∈ #»o , we have that [[ #»o ]]U , ∅ thus L([[ #»o ]]U) , ∅.
Therefore L(U, [[ #»o ]]) , ∅, so there is y ∈ L(U, [[ #»o ]]). Then, by the semantics of
L, we obtain that (y,U) |= L( #»o ). Thus (x,U) |= 〈K〉L( #»o ).
• (EC): Suppose (x,U) |= #»o ⇔ #»o′. We need to show that (x,U) |= L( #»o )↔ L( #»o′).
It suffices to show (x,U) |= L( #»o ) → L( #»o′), since the other direction of the bi-
conditional is analogous. Suppose (x,U) |= L( #»o ). Since (x,U) |= #»o ⇔ #»o′ we
have that x ∈ [[K(∧ #»o ↔ ∧ #»o′)]]U . Therefore, by the semantics of K, we obtain
that for all y ∈ U, it is the case that y ∈ [[(∧ #»o ↔ ∧ #»o′)]]U . This means that for
all y ∈ U, y ∈ [[∧ #»o ]]U iff y ∈ [[∧ #»o′]]U . Since L( #»O) := L(⋂ #»O), by our assump-
tion we have that x ∈ L(U, [[ #»o ]]) = L(U, [[∧ #»o ]]) = L(U, [[∧ #»o′]]) = L(U, [[ #»o′]]).
By the semantic definition of L, we have (x,U) |= L( #»o′).
• (SP): Suppose (x,U) |= L( #»o ). By semantic definition and the fact that L( #»O) :=
L(
⋂ #»
O), we have x ∈ L(U, [[ #»o ]]) = L(U ∩ [[ #»o ]]) = L(U ∩ [[∧ #»o ]]). Since we
have that L(O) ⊆ O from Definition 2, then x ∈ L(U ∩ [[∧ #»o ]]) ⊆ U ∩ [[∧ #»o ]].
Therefore x ∈ [[∧ #»o ]]U , it follows that (x,U) |= ∧ #»o .
– (RL): We will only prove from left to right of the bi-conditional, the other direction
is also straightforward by using the properties of L and the semantic definition of L.
Suppose (x,U) |= [o′]L( #»o ). This means that x ∈ ||o′|| implies (x,U ∩ ||o′||) |= L( #»o ),
i.e., that x ∈ ||o′|| implies x ∈ L(U ∩ ||o′||, || #»o ||) = L(U, ||o′||, || #»o ||) = L(U, ||o′, #»o ||)
(where the last two equalities follows from L(
#»
O) := L(
⋂ #»
O)). Then, by the seman-
tics of L, we have that (x,U) |= o′ → L(o′, #»o ).
– (R):
(x,U) |= [o]ϕ
iff x ∈ ||o|| implies (x,U ∩ ||o||) |= ϕ (by the semantics of [o])
iff x ∈ ||o|| implies (∀O ∈ O)(x ∈ O implies (x, (U ∩ ||o||) ∩ O) |= ϕ)
(by the semantics of )
iff (∀O ∈ O)((x ∈ ||o|| and x ∈ O) implies (x, (U ∩ ||o||) ∩ O) |= ϕ))
iff (∀O ∈ O)(x ∈ O implies (x ∈ ||o|| implies (x, (U ∩ O) ∩ ||o||) |= ϕ))
iff (∀O ∈ O)(x ∈ O implies (x,U ∩ O) |= [o]ϕ) (by the semantics of [o])
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iff (x,U) |= [o]ϕ) (by the semantics of )
– (-Ax): Suppose (x,U) |= ϕ. This mean, by the semantics of , that for all O ∈ O
with x ∈ O we have (x,U ∩ O) |= ϕ. In particular, since ||o|| ∈ O for all o ∈ PropO ,
we obtain that x ∈ ||o|| implies (x,U ∩ ||o||) |= ϕ. Moreover, for every #»o ∈ Prop∗O ,
x ∈ [[∧ #»o ]]U implies (x,U ∩ [[∧ #»o ]]) |= ϕ. Therefore by the semantic definition we
have (x,U) |= [ #»o ]ϕ for every string #»o of observational variables.
– (-Rule): Suppose towards a contradiction that |= ψ → [o]ϕ and 6|= ψ → ϕ
where o < Oψ ∪ Oϕ. The latter means that there’s a learning modelM and (x,U)
epistemic scenario such that (x,U) |=M ψ → [o]ϕ and (x,U) 6|=M ψ → ϕ, i.e.,
(x,U) |=M ψ and (x,U) 6|=M ϕ. Thus, (x,U) |=M ψ and (x,U) |=M ^¬ϕ. By the
semantics of ^, ∃U0 ⊆ U s.t x ∈ U0 implies (x,U0) |=M ¬ϕ. Now consider the
modelM′ with exactly the same frame asM and the following valuation: ||o||M′ =
U0, ||u||M′ = ||u||M for all u , o ∈ PropO and ||p||M′ = ||p||M for all p ∈ Prop.
By Lemma 1, we have that [[ψ]]UM′ = [[ψ]]
U
M and [[¬ϕ]]U0M′ = [[¬ϕ]]U0M . Therefore
(x,U) |=M′ ψ and (x,U0) |=M′ ¬ϕ. Since ||o||M′ = U0, we have (x,U) |=M′ ψ and
(x, ||o||M′ ) |=M′ ¬ϕ. By the semantics of 〈o〉 we obtain (x,U) |=M′ ψ ∧ 〈o〉¬ϕ. Thus
(x,U) 6|=M′ ψ→ [o]ϕ, contradicting the validity of |= ψ→ [o]ϕ.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Let Γ ⊆ LO be an O-theory and ϕ ∈ LO such that Γ 0 ¬ϕ. We first that Γ ∪ {ϕ} is an
O-theory. Suppose by contradiction that Γ∪{ϕ} is not an O-theory, i.e., that Γ∪{ϕ} ` ⊥.
Thus, there is a finite ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆ ` ¬ϕ and therefore Γ ` ¬ϕ, which contradicts
the assumption that Γ 0 ¬ϕ.
Now suppose that Γ is O-witnessed but Γ ∪ {ϕ} is not O-witnessed. By the previous
statement, we know that Γ ∪ {ϕ} consistent. Therefore, the latter means that there is
s ∈ NFO
L
and ψ ∈ LO such that Γ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent with 〈s〉^ψ but Γ ∪ {ϕ} ` ¬〈s〉〈o〉ψ
for all o ∈ O. This implies that Γ ∪ {ϕ} ` [s][o]¬ψ for all o ∈ O. Therefore, Γ ` ϕ →
[s][o]¬ψ for all o ∈ O. Note that ϕ→ [s][o]¬ψ := [ϕ→, s][o]¬ψ, and [ϕ→, s] ∈ NFO
L
.
We thus have Γ ` [ϕ →, s][o]¬ψ for all o ∈ O. Since Γ is O-witnessed, we obtain
Γ ` [ϕ→, s]¬ψ. By unraveling the necessity form [ϕ→, s], we get Γ ` ϕ→ [s]¬ψ,
thus, Γ∪{ϕ} ` [s]¬ψ, i.e., Γ∪{ϕ} ` ¬〈s〉^ψ, contradicting the assumption that Γ∪{ϕ}
is consistent with 〈s〉^ψ.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 5: Lindenbaum’s lemma
For the proof of Lemma 5 we need the following auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 12. For every maximal O-witnessed theory Γ, and any ϕ, ψ ∈ LO,
1. either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ,
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ iff ϕ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ,
3. ϕ ∈ Γ and ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ implies ψ ∈ Γ.
Lemma 13. If Γ0 ⊆ Γ1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Γn ⊆ . . . is an increasing chain of O-theories, then⋃
n∈N Γn is an O-theory.
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Proof. Let Γ0 ⊆ Γ1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Γn ⊆ . . . be an increasing chain of O-theories and suppose,
toward contradiction, that
⋃
n∈N Γn is not an O-theory, i.e., suppose that
⋃
n∈N Γn ` ⊥.
This means that there exists a finite ∆ ⊆ ⋃n∈N Γn such that ∆ ` ⊥. Then, since ⋃n∈N Γn
is a union of an increasing chain of O-theories, there is some m ∈ N such that ∆ ⊆ Γm.
Therefore, Γm ` ⊥ contradicting the fact that Γm is an O-theory.
Proof of Lemma 5 (Lindendaum’s lemma): The proof follows by constructing an
increasing chain of
Γ0 ⊆ Γ1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Γn ⊆ . . . ,
O-witnessed theories where Γ0 := Γ, and each Γi will be recursively defined. We have
to guarantee that each Γi is O-witnessed, in order to do so we follow a two-fold con-
struction, where Γ0 = Γ′0 := Γ. Let γn := (sn, ϕn) be the nth-pair in the enumeration A
of all pairs of the form (s, ϕ) consisting of a possibility form s as described in Defini-
tion 4, and a formula ϕ, both in the language LO. Note that all pairs of the form (λ, ϕ),
for every formula ϕ ∈ LO and the empty string λ of observational variables, are in A.
By the definition of necessity forms and possibility forms we have that every formula
ϕ ∈ LO can be written as ϕ := 〈λ〉ϕ = [λ]ϕ. Therefore, all formulas in LO are considered
in the enumerationA. We then set
Γ′n =
{
Γn ∪ {〈sn〉ϕn} if Γ 0 ¬〈sn〉ϕn
Γn otherwise
By Lemma 4, each Γ′n is O-witnessed. Then, if ϕn is of the form ϕn := ^θ for
some θ ∈ LO, there exists an o ∈ O such that Γ′n is consistent with 〈s〉〈o〉θ (since Γ′n is
O-witnessed). We then define
Γn+1 =

Γ′n if Γn 0 ¬〈sn〉ϕn and ϕn is not of the form ^θ
Γ′n ∪ {〈sn〉〈o〉θ} if Γn 0 ¬〈sn〉ϕn and ϕn := ^θ for some θ ∈ LO
Γn otherwise
where o ∈ O such that Γ′n is consistent with 〈s〉〈o〉θ. Again by Lemma 4, it is guaranteed
that each Γn is O-witnessed. Now consider the union TΓ =
⋃
n∈N Γn. By Lemma 13, we
know that TΓ is an O-theory. To show that TΓ is O-witnessed, let s ∈ NFOL and θ ∈ LO
and suppose 〈s〉^θ is consistent with TΓ. The pair (s,^θ) appears in the enumeration
A, thus γm := (sm, ϕm) = (s,^θ) with sm := s and ϕm := ^θ, for some γm ∈ A.
Since 〈sm〉ϕm is consistent with TΓ and Γm ⊆ TΓ, we know that 〈sm〉^θ is in particular
consistent with Γm. Therefore, by the above construction, 〈s〉〈o〉θ ∈ Γm+1 for some
o ∈ O such that Γ′m is consistent with 〈s〉〈o〉θ. Therefore, as TΓ is consistent and Γm+1 ⊆
TΓ, we have that 〈s〉〈o〉θ is also consistent with TΓ. Hence, we conclude that TΓ is O-
witnessed. Finally, TΓ is also maximal by construction: otherwise there would be an
O-witnessed theory T such that TΓ ⊂ T . This implies that there exists ϕ ∈ LO with
ϕ ∈ T but ϕ < TΓ. Then, by the construction of TΓ, we obtain Γi ` ¬〈λ〉ϕ for all i ∈ N.
Thus Γi ` ¬ϕ for all i ∈ N. Therefore, since TΓ ⊆ T , we have T ` ¬ϕ. Hence, since
ϕ ∈ T , we obtain T ` ⊥ (contradicting T being consistent).
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7.5 Proof of Lemma 6: Extension Lemma
Proof. Let A = {γ0, γ1, . . . , γn, . . .} be an enumeration of all pairs of the form γi :=
(si, ϕi) consisting of any necessity form si as described in Definition 4, and every
formula ϕi in the language L
∼
O. We will recursively construct a chain of
∼
O-theories
Γ0 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Γn ⊆ . . . such that:
1. Γ0 = Γ,
2. O′n = {o ∈ O′ : o occurs in Γn} is finite for every n ∈ N, and,
3. for every γn := (sn, ϕn) with sn ∈ NFOL and ϕn ∈ LO:
If Γn 0 ¬〈sn〉^ϕn then there is om “fresh” such that 〈sn〉〈om〉ϕn ∈ Γn+1. Otherwise
we will define Γn+1 = Γn.
For every γn ∈ A, let O′(n) = {o ∈ O′ : o occurs either in sn or ϕn}. Clearly every
O′(n) is always finite. We now construct an increasing chain of
∼
O-theories recursively:
We fix Γ0 := Γ and let
Γn+1 =

Γn ∪ {〈sn〉〈om〉ϕn} if Γn 0 ¬〈sn〉^ϕn
Γn otherwise
where m is the least natural number bigger than the indices in O′n ∪O′(n), i.e., om is
fresh; We now need to show that
∼
Γ :=
⋃
n∈N Γn is an
∼
O-witnessed theory.
We first show that
∼
Γ is an
∼
O-theory. By Lemma 13, it suffices to show by induction
that every Γn is an
∼
O-theory. Clearly Γ0 is an
∼
O-theory. For the inductive step suppose
by contradiction that: Γn 0 ¬〈sn〉^ϕn, Γn is consistent but Γn+1 is not. Hence Γ ,
Γn+1 , Γn, and moreover Γn+1 ` ⊥. Then, since Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {〈sn〉〈om〉ϕn}, we have
Γn ` [sn][om]¬ϕn. Therefore there exists {θ1, . . . , θk} ⊆ Γn such that {θ1, . . . , θk} `
[sn][om]¬ϕn. Let θ = ∧1≤i≤k θi. Then ` θ → [sn][om]¬ϕn, so ` [θ →, sn][om]¬ϕn with
om < OΓn∪Osn∪Oϕn . Then, by the admissible rule in Lemma 3, we obtain the following,
` [θ →, sn]¬ϕn (Lemma 3)
` θ → [sn]¬ϕn
θ ` [sn]¬ϕn
θ ` ¬〈sn〉^ϕn (Dual)
Since {θ1, . . . , θk} ⊆ Γn, we therefore have Γn ` ¬〈sn〉^ϕn contradicting our assump-
tion. Therefore Γn+1 is consistent and thus an
∼
O-theory. Therefore, by Lemma 13,
∼
Γ is
an
∼
O-theory. Condition (3) above implies that
∼
Γ is also
∼
O-witnessed. Then, by Linden-
baum’s Lemma, there is a maximal O-witnessed theory TΓ such that TΓ ⊇
∼
Γ ⊇ Γ.
7.6 Proofs of Lemmas 7, 8 and 9
Proof (Lemma 7). Observe that, by axiom (TK), {θ : Kθ ∈ T } ⊆ T . Therefore, as T
is consistent, the set {θ : Kθ ∈ T } is consistent. Let s ∈ NFO
L
and ϕ ∈ LO such that
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{θ : Kθ ∈ T } ` [s][o]¬ϕ for all o ∈ O. Then, by normality of K, T ` K[s][o]¬ϕ for all
o ∈ O. Since K[s][o]¬ϕ := [K, s][o]¬ϕ is a necessity form and T is O-witnessed, we
obtain T ` [K, s]¬ϕ, i.e., T ` K[s]¬ϕ. As T is maximal, we have K[s]¬ϕ ∈ T , thus
[s]¬ϕ ∈ {θ : Kθ ∈ T }.
Proof (Lemma 8 and Corolary 1). From left-to-right follows directly from the definition
ofXc and ∼K . For the right-to-left direction, we prove the contrapositive: Let ϕ ∈ L such
that Kϕ < T . Then, by Lemma 7 and Lemma 4, we obtain that {ψ : Kψ ∈ T }∪{¬ϕ} is an
O-witnessed theory. We can then apply Lindenbaum’s Lemma (Lemma 5) and extend
it to a maximal O-witnessed theory S such that ϕ < S .
Proof (Lemma 9). The proof is straightforward. The direction from left-to-right follows
by the axiom (-Ax). For the direction from right-to-left, suppose, toward a contradic-
tion, that for all #»u ∈ Prop∗O, [ #»u ]ϕ ∈ T and ϕ < T . Then, since T is a maximally
consistent theory, ^¬ϕ ∈ T . Since T is an O-witnessed theory, there is v ∈ O such that
〈v〉¬ϕ is consistent with T . Since T is also maximally consistent, we obtain 〈v〉¬ϕ ∈ T ,
contradicting our initial assumption.
8 Proofs of Section 4: Expressivity
Proof (Proposition 8). Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ϕ is a formula which is
not free of dynamic modalities, and moreover that ϕ is not provably equivalent to any
formula of lower complexity (in the sense of <) that is free of dynamic modalities. We
construct an infinite descending sequence
ϕ0 > ϕ1 > . . . > ϕn > . . .
of provably equivalent formulas, none of which is free of dynamic modalities. The con-
struction goes as follows: we first put ϕ0 := ϕ. Then, at step n, assuming given ϕn
not free of dynamic modalities and provably equivalent to all the previous formulas,
we chose the first dynamic modality occurring in ϕn and apply once to it the relevant
Reduction Axiom (from left to right), obtaining a provably equivalent formula ϕn+1,
which by the previous Lemma has the property that ϕn+1 < ϕn. By transitivity of prov-
able equivalence, ϕn+1 is provably equivalent to ϕ0 = ϕ, and (by transitivity of <) it is
of lower complexity than ϕ0 = ϕ; so, by our assumption above, ϕn+1 is still not free of
dynamic modalities. But the existence of this infinite descending sequence contradicts
the well-foundedness of <.
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